The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act:  Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 78 Issue 7 
1980 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judicial 
Role in National Security Surveillance 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the National Security Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judicial Role in National 
Security Surveillance, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1116 (1980). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol78/iss7/4 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTES 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a 
Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance 
Since World War II American Presidents have claimed constitu-
tional authority to conduct wiretapping and electronic surveillance 
for national security purposes.1 Successive Presidents have sought to 
expand the scope of this claimed authority2 and to protect it from 
judicial and legislative limitations.3 For three decades courts failed 
to strike a clear balance between the President's national security 
surveillance powers and citizens' fourth amendment rights.4 Con-
gress, on its part, deferred to presidential claims of inherent author-
ity in the national security area5 until the abuses revealed during the 
Watergate scandals increased anxiety over the executive's exclusive 
I. See text at notes 12-21 i'!fra. This Note concerns electronic surveillance rather than 
unaided personal surveillance. The term "surveillance" refers to interception of wire, radio, or 
oral communications through the use of an electronic, mechanical, or other device. For spe-
cific statutory definitions of this term, see Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, § 2510, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1976); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, § lOI(f), 50 U.S.C. § 180l(f) (Supp. II 1978). The term "foreign intelligence surveil-
lance" refers to electronic national security surveillance conducted within the United States for 
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. When the purpose of national security surveil-
lance is to gather domestic intelligence, the fourth amendment requires the government to seek 
a warrant before conducting the surveillance. United States v. United States District Court, 
407 U.S. 297, 314-21, 323-24 (1972). See text at notes 39-47 In/hr, note 31 infra. 
2. See text at notes 12-21 infra. See generally Bernstein, The Road to Watergate and Be-
yond· The Growth and Abuse of Executive Authority Since 1940, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 58 
(Spring 1976). 
3. See, e.g., Right of Privacy Act, S. 928, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (President Johnson's 
proposed legislation to prohibit electronic eavesdropping except in national security cases); 
Brief for the United States at 9-11, 15-19, 29-34, United States v. United States District Court, 
407 U.S. 297 (1972); compare SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL 
AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968, s. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, reprinted in (1968] 
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2112, 2156-57, 2182-83, with Additional Views of Mr. Hart on 
Title III of S. 917, S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 174, reprinted in (1968) U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2227, 2235-36. 
4. See text at notes 12-27 i'!fra. 
5. The warrant requirements established in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C, 
§§ 2510-2520 (1976)), did not apply to the gathering of foreign intelligence information. See 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976). Congressional proposals to regulate national security surveillance 
were relatively common after Watergate. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1976, S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); National Security Surveillance Act of 1975, S, 743, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Freedom from Surveillance Act of 1974, S. 4062, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1974); Surveillance Procedures Act of 1973, S. 2820, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); SENATE 
SELECT COMM, TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERI• 
CANS, s. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 265-341 (1976), reprinted in THE INTELLIGENCI! 
COMMUNITY 872-947 (T. Fain ed. 1977). None of the proposed bills, however, reached a vote 
in either chamber until 1978. 
1116 
June 1980] Note - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 1117 
exercise of the surveillance power.6 This concern led the Ninety-fifth 
Congress to pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
[FISA].7 The FISA requires the executive to seek court approval 
before employing electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelli-
gence within the United States. The Act creates a special court to 
hear government warrant requests and establishes judicial standards 
that limit the circumstances in which warrants can be issued. The 
Act also imposes civil and criminal penalties for conducting unau-
thorized surveillance or using information so obtained. 8 
Congressional opponents of the FISA argued that the bill was 
invalid under the separation of powers doctrine because it en-
croached on the President's constitutional authority to conduct for-
eign intelligence activities within the United States.9 Although 
Congress passed the FISA over these objections, the courts have not 
yet resolved this constitutional issue. It is foreseeable that an execu-
tive agency or employee will respond to a civil or criminal prosecu-
tion for unwarranted surveillance by questioning the Act's 
constitutionality. 10 
6. The view that unrestrained executive power might lead to abuse preceded Watergate, 
see, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 264-66, 377 (1973); see also w. 
LAFEBER, AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND THE COLD WAR: 1945-1971, at 298 (2d ed. 1972); THE 
PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG 342 (A. Vandenberg, Jr. ed. 1952), but it was only 
after the actual abuses revealed during the Watergate scandals that anxiety about the execu-
tive's misuse of power became a prominent part of American political culture. See, e.g., 3 
CURRENT OPINION 94 (1975) (Americans believe that government wrongdoing and lack of 
leadership are leading causes of nation's problems); cf. 4 CURRENT OPINION 62 (1976) (sixty 
percent of Iowans feel Congress should dominate foreign policy); 4 CURRENT OPINION 61-62 
(1976) (growing public aversion to "big government"); 2 CURRENT OPINION 4 (1974) (five to 
four majority favors Congress limiting President's war-making powers). 
7. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (Title I to be codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 
(Supp. II 1978)) [hereinafter cited as FISAJ. The conference committee report is H. R. REP. 
No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4048. De-
bate and final passage are reported in 124 CONG. REC. Sl4,882-84 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1978) and 
124 CONG. REC. Hl2,533-43 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978). See Berlow, Wiretaps Control Bill Sent 
to President, 36 CONG. Q. 2964 (1978). 
8. FISA § 110 provides that any person, other than a foreign power or an employee or 
officer of a foreign power, who has been the subject of electronic surveillance or about whom 
information obtained by surveillance has been improperly disclosed may bring a civil action 
seeking recovery of "actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages of $1,000 or $100 
per day for each day of violation, whichever is greater," punitive damages, and reasonable 
attorney's fees. Section 109 provides that any person who intentionally engages in electronic 
surveillance under color oflaw except as authorized by'statute, or who discloses or uses infor-
mation so obtained knowing that the surveillance was unauthorized, is guilty of a crime pun-
ishable by a fine of up to $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. 
9. See, e.g., Dissenting Views on the Conference Report to Accompany S. 1566, The For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted 
in 124 CONG. REC. HI 1,682, HI 1,683-84 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978). 
10. The Carter administration supported the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, see S. 
REP. No. 604, Part I, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977), reprinted in [1978) U.S. CooE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 3904, 3905; Bell, Electronic Surveillance and the Free Society, 23 ST. Loms U. L.J. I, 
7-9 (1979), and President Carter signed the Act into law, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 
1853 (Oct. 27, 1978). Nevertheless, even the Carter administration may eventually challenge 
the Act in court. While the Act was pending before Congress, President Carter approved war-
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This Note evaluates the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act. Section I summarizes the legal history of 
national security surveillance from 1940 until the passage of the 
FISA, and briefly discusses the three major circuit court rulings on 
warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance. Section II describes the 
provisions of the Act. 11 Section III examines the Act's constitution-
ality, first considering the scope of congressional authority to regu-
late the conduct of foreign affairs, then considering whether the 
political question doctrine prevents judicial scrutiny of executive de-
cisions to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance. The Note con-
cludes that the FISA is an appropriate and constitutional exercise of 
congressional authority to accommodate presidential power and 
fourth amendment rights, and that the political question doctrine 
does not bar judicial review of executive foreign intelligence surveil-
lance requests. 
I. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE 
. In 1928 the Supreme Court ruled in Olmstead v. United States12 
that domestic wiretapping and surveillance was beyond the reach of 
fourth amendment protections unless accomplished by physical tres-
pass into a constitutionally protected area. 13 Olmstead left the bur-
rantless foreign intelligence surveillance of at least one citizen within the United States. See 
Chagnon v. Bell, 568 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1979), offd. No. 79-1232 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 14, 1980); 
United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978) offd sub nom. United States v. 
Truong, No. 78-5176 (4th Cir. July 17, 1980). Whether such surveillances continued after the 
Act's passage is unknown. Moreover, President Carter's signing of the bill will not bind future 
administrations which might oppose the Act on policy or constitutional grounds. See National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 n.12 (1976). 
There is also debate whether the FISA goes far enough. One commentator questions the 
ability of a foreign security surveillance warrant requirement to adequately safeguard personal 
liberty, Note, Present and Proposed Standards for Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance, 
71 Nw. U.L. REV. 109, 120-22 (1976). Another commentator views appearance before a neu-
tral magistrate as an effective deterrent to the most questionable surveillances, Comment, Elec-
tronic Surveillance - Foreign Intelligence - Wiretapping of an Alien Spy far Foreign 
Intelligence Purposes J)oes Not Violate Communications Act of 1934 or Fourth Amendment -
U.S. v. Butenko, 8 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & PoL. 479, 517 (1976). A careful middle ground, 
offering hope for a warrant requirement but cautioning against excessive optimism, is offered 
in Lacovara, Presidential Power to Gather Intelligence: The Tension Between Article II and 
Amendment IV, 40 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 106, 126-31 (Summer 1976). 
This Note does not debate the efficacy of the FISA. That issue is best resolved from experi-
ence with the Act. The Attorney General is required to regularly inform the House and Senate 
Select Committees on Intelligence of this experience. FISA § l08(a). 
11. For discussion of the Act's predecessor, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1976, S. 3197, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), see Note, Foreign Security Surveillance-Balancing 
Executive Power and the Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM L. REV, 1179 (1977). For an exten-
sive discussion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 before Senate and House 
action and conference committee amendments, see Shapiro, The Foreign lntelllgence Surve/1-
lance Act: Legislative Balancing of National Security and the Fourth Amendment, 15 HARV, J, 
LEGIS. 119 {1977). 
12. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
13. 277 U.S. at 464. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). But cf. Silverman v. United 
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den of regulating domestic surveillance to Congress. Congress 
responded by enacting section 605 of the Communications Act of 
1934, 14 which prohibits both unauthorized interception of any pri-
vate radio or wire communications and unauthorized use or publica-
tion of any information contained in such communications. In 
Nardone v. United States, the Supreme Court held that evidence col-
lected in violation of section 605 was inadmissible in federal criminal 
trials. 15 
Section 605 and the Nardone ruling had little impact on national 
security surveillance for two reasons. First, the inadmissibility of il-
legally obtained evidence only deterred national security surveil-
lance when the government's objectives were limited to successful 
criminal prosecutions. Since collection of information was often in 
itself the government's primary motive, the exclusion of evidence 
was an ineffective deterrent 16• Second, the executive branch con-
cluded that section 605 did not apply to national security investiga-
tions. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, while agreeing with the 
"broad purpose of the [Nardone] decision relating to wiretapping in-
vestigations," remained "convinced that the Supreme Court never 
intended any dictum . . . to apply to grave matters involving the 
defense of the nation." 17 Thus in 1940 he authorized Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Jackson to approve wiretaps and to direct federal agents 
"to secure information by listening devices direct[ ed] to the conver-
sation or other communications of persons suspected of subversive 
activities against the Government of the United States, including 
suspected spies." 18 Although Roosevelt requested both that these in-
vestigations be directed, insofar as possible, against aliens alone and 
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (spike microphone pushed through party wall and touching heating 
duct constituted physical intrusion). 
14. Ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976)). See 
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Nardone J]; Nardone 
v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Nardone I.I]. 
15. Nardone I, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Nardone sought to exclude evidence obtained through 
a wiretap by federal agents. The agents had not invaded a "constitutionally protected area," 
see, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961), and the Court had not yet 
applied the fourth amendment to non-trespassory invasions of privacy, see Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). In Nardone I, the Court held section 605 applicable to law 
enforcement agents and barred the introduction of wiretap records, 302 U.S. at 383; in Nardone 
II, the Court barred the introduction of evidence derived from the wiretap, the "fruits" of the 
illegal surveillance. 308 U.S. at 340-43. 
16. Some law enforcement officials did believe that section 605 unduly restrained them 
when their object was successful criminal investigation and prosecution. See, e.g., Report by 
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 17ze Challenge 
of Crime in a Free Society (1967); Rogers, 17ze Case far Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 793-
97 (1954). 
17. Confidential Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Robert H. Jackson (May 
21, 1940), reprintedin Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 673-74 app. (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en 
bane}, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). 
18. 516 F.2d at 674 app. 
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that they be limited in number, 19 later Presidents expanded surveil-
lance beyond these limits. In 1946 President Truman accepted At-
torney General Clark's proposal for an expanded surveillance 
program. Clark's plan did not limit surveillance to aliens; instead, it 
proposed the use of "these special investigative measures in domestic 
cases."20 Electronic surveillance was used increasingly by each suc-
ceeding administration.21 
Throughout this period of expansion, the legal doctrines gov-
erning wiretapping and other electronic eavesdropping remained 
fairly static. A dramatic turnabout in 1967 upset this equilibrium. 
In Katz v. United States,22 the Supreme Court overruled Olmstead 
and held for the first time that warrantless electronic surveillance 
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth 
amendment.23 The Court held that government officers must obtain 
a warrant from a neutral magistrate24 before employing wiretapping 
or electronic surveillance in the course of any state25 or federal crim-
inal investigation. But the Court presaged a possible exception: 
Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate 
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the na-
tional security is a question not presented by this case.26 
This national security exception permitted increasing warrantless 
surveillance within the United States.27 
19. 516 F.2d at 674 app. 
20. Letter from Tom C. Clark to Harry S. Truman (July 17, 1946), reprinted in Zweibon v. 
Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 674 app. 
21. See SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT 
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, BOOK Ill: FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLI· 
GENCE, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 301 (1976). See also, Lacovara supra note 10, at 
106, 107-09. See generally Bernstein, supra note 2. 
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
23. The fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
24. 389 U.S. at 356. 
25. The fourteenth amendment applies the fourth amendment to the states. Ker v. Califor-
nia, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963), had established that the same "standards of reasonableness" re-
quired of the federal government under the fourth amendment are also required of the states. 
This holding was applied in a surveillance case, albeit one involving an intrusion into a consti-
tutionally protected area, in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
26. 389 U.S. at 358 n.23. Although the Court did not answer this question, three Justices 
briefly expressed their views on the national security exception in concurring opinions. Justice 
White argued that the President's article II powers and duties require an exception to the 
warrant requirement for national security cases. White offered no lengthy analysis or prece-
dent supporting his conclusion. 389 U.S. at 364. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Brennan, 
opposed the exception proposed by Justice White, arguing that the President's and Attorney 
General's duties to "vigorously investigate and prevent breaches of national security and pros-
ecute those who violate federal laws" make it impossible for them to act as "disinterested, 
neutral magistrate[s]." 389 U.S. at 359-60. 
27. See, e.g., Surveillance Practices and Procedures Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 2820 Before 
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In response to Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.28 This Act set out pro-
cedures by which government officials could obtain warrants for 
electronic surveillance in criminal investigations. Unlike section 605 
of the Communications Act of 1934, which simply prohibited all per-
sons from intercepting wire and radio communications in most cir-
cumstances, 29 Title III set standards for court approval of these types 
of surveillance. 30 Section 605 provided penalties for violations by 
any person; Title III punished only illegal surveillance under color of 
law. 
The standards of Title III of the Safe Streets Act failed to narrow 
the Katz exception because they did not apply to national security 
surveillances, whether classified as domestic or foreign.31 Moreover, 
section 2511(3) of Title III disclaimed any congressional intent to 
expand or contract the President's authority "to obtain foreign intel-
the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures ef the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1974) (statement of Attorney General William B. Saxbe) (asserting a right 
to break into a citizen's home without a warrant and search for items that might be used in 
foreign espionage or intelligence cases); 6 Political Abuse and the FBL· Hearings on S. Res. 21 
Before the Senate Select Comm. lo Study Governmental Operations with Respect lo Intelligence 
Activities, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). "National security" was the justification for some of 
the most flagrant abuses of the Nixon administration. See, e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 
F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2915 (1980) (suit over 21-month warrant-
less wiretap of former National Security Council employee); Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183 
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. applied for, No. 79-882 (Dec. 7, 1979) (warrantless wiretap of New York 
Times reporter); United States v. Russo and Ellsberg, No. 9373 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1973) 
(dismissal for government failure to produce wiretap records); H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess. 146 (1974) (Second Impeachment Article charging President Nixon with authorizing 
"Electronic Surveillance or Other Investigations for Purposes Unrelated to National Security, 
the Enforcement of Laws or Any Other Lawful Function of His Office"; the report concluded 
that these surveillances were for "political purposes," id. at 35); 2 Hearings Before the Senate 
Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect lo Intelligence Activities, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 141-88, reprinted in THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 817-71 (T. Fain ed. 1977) 
(revealing the "Huston Plan,'' which proposed wiretaps of various domestic political groups 
without judicial approval); Hearings on the Role ef J)r. Henry Kissinger in the Wiretapping ef 
Certain Government Officials and Newsmen Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activili'es, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) ("Watergate" el al); 119 CONG. REC. 41864 (1973) (invocation by 
White House officials of national security justification for inducing the CIA to assist in the 
burglary of Daniel Ells berg's psychiatrist's office). 
28. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)). See, S. 
REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-76 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 2112, 2153-63. 
29. 47 u.s.c. § 605 (1976). 
30. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)). 
31. Whether an organization, and presumably the threat caused by that organization, is 
domestic or foreign is determined on the basis of its composition - U.S. citizens or non-
citizens - and its connections - the significance of its "connection with a foreign power, its 
agents or agencies." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 309 n.8 
(1972). Bui cf. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 613-14 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane) 
(plurality opinion), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (threat posed by domestic Jewish Defense 
League was foreign security since its actions provoked a foreign power, the Soviet Union). 
This part of the Zweibon decision is criticized in Case Comment, Title III and National Secur-
ity Surveillances, 56 B.U. L. REv. 776, 787-89 (1976). 
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ligence information deemed essential to the security of the United 
States, or to protect national security information against foreign in-
telligence activities."32 In passing the Act in 1968, "Congress simply 
left presidential powers where it found them."33 
Four years later, in United States v. United States .District 
Court,34 the Justice Department asked the Supreme Court to deter-
mine the scope of the President's power to approve a warrantless 
wiretap under the national security exception to the requirements of 
Title III. United States .District Court, however, involved only "the 
domestic aspects of national security."35 Richard Plamondon, who 
had been indicted for the bombing of a CIA office in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, sought disclosure of the Government's electronic surveil-
lance records and a hearing to determine whether the Government 
had used information from warrantless wiretaps to support his in-
dictment. The Government claimed that its surveillance, though 
warrantless, was a lawful exercise of presidential power to protect 
national security. District Judge Damon Keith ruled36 that the sur-
veillance violated the fourth amendment and that records of the 
wiretaps therefore had to be disclosed to Plamondon under the rule 
of Alderman v. United States.31 Both the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court order.38 
32. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 25II(3), 82 Stat. 214 (1968) (previously codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 25ll(3) (1976)), provided: 
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 
1934 (48 Stat. ll43 [sic, probably meant to be ll03]; 47 U.S.C. § 605) shall limit the 
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to 
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign 
power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the 
United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence ac-
tivities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional 
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United 
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or 
against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Govern-
ment. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by the authority of the 
President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in any trial, hearing, or 
other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise 
used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power. 
33. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 303 (1972). See also 114 
CONG. REC. 14751 (1968), reprinted in 407 U.S. at 306-07. 
34. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
35. 407 U.S. at 308-09, 321-22 (1972). The defendants were members of an organization 
that had no foreign ties. 407 U.S. at 300 n.2. 
36. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1079-80 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
37. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). Alderman concerned procedures for determining whether evi-
dence offered in a criminal trial is tainted by illegal surveillance. A divided Court held that 
records of conversations illegally overheard, even in cases of national security surveillance, 
must be disclosed to the defendant. The Court did not decide, however, whether warrantless 
national security wiretapping was in fact unlawful. See Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 
310, 314-15 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
38. United States v. United States District Court, 444 F.2d 651, 664-69 (6th Cir. 1971), 
qffd., 407 U.S. 297, 321-24 (1972). 
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Although the Supreme Court limited its inquiry to the issue of 
whether warrants are required prior to surveillance in domestic se-
curity cases (ie., in cases where threats to national security originate 
from American citizens or groups), United States IJistrict Court es-
tablished a balancing approach that applies to foreign security sur-
veillance as well. The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress, in 
enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act, intended to leave the President's power undisturbed and the 
question of the warrant requirement for national security wiretaps 
unanswered.39 Since Title III failed to determine the wiretap's legal-
ity,40 the Court turned to the fourth amendment standard of "rea-
sonableness."41 According to the Court, this standard requires a 
balancing approach:42 the Government's interest in protecting the 
domestic security, especially the President's duty to "take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed,"43 must be weighed against the citi-
zen's first and fourth amendment interests in privacy and free ex-
pression. 44 
39. 407 U.S. at 306-07. 
40. Justice White felt that the Plamondon surveillance did not fall within the § 2511(3) 
disclaimer. 407 U.S. at 341 (White, J., concurring). White also believed that the Attorney 
General's affidavit did not suggest that the surveillance was necessary to prevent overthrow of 
the Government by force or other unlawful means or to protect against any other clear and 
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. 407 U.S. at 341. White argued 
that, absent the grave threat required by the plain words of§ 2511(3), the disclaimer did not 
apply and the general warrant requirements of Title III had to be met. On these statutory 
grounds, Justice White concurred in the court's judgment without reaching the constitutional 
issue. 407 U.S. at 335-44. 
Justice White's concurring opinion in United States .District Court is an interesting contrast 
to his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362-64 (1967). In Katz, 
Justice White claimed that the President had the inherent power to authorize warrantless wire-
taps in "national security cases," 389 U.S. at 363; White did not distinguish the domestic and 
foreign aspects of national security. Justice White's statutory reasoning in United States .Dis-
trict Court therefore implies either a change of view since Katz or a view that Congress could 
limit the President's inherent power. The latter seems to be the case: 
Thus, even assuming the constitutionality of a warrantless surveillance authorized by the 
President to uncover private or official graft forbidden by federal statute, the interception 
would be illegal under§ 2511(1) because it is not the type of presidential action saved by 
the Act by the provision of§ 2511(3) .... [T]he United States does not claim that Con-
gress is powerless to require warrants for surveillances that the President otherwise would 
not be barred by the Fourth Amendment from undertaking without a warrant. 
407 U.S. at 338 n.2 (White, J., concurring); compare text at notes 118-41 infra. 
41. 407 U.S. at 308-10. The Court cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), 
for the proposition that the standard for a search's reasonableness is derived from the Warrant 
Clause. 407 U.S. at 309-10. According to the Court, the relevant test is not whether the search 
is reasonable, but whether it is reasonable to require the procurement of a search warrant. 407 
U.S. at 315. 
42. 407 U.S. at 314. 
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
44. If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic security requires the use 
of electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs of citizens for privacy and free 
expression may not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such surveillance is 
undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the 
efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow directed 
against it. 
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The Court held that despite the President's constitutional man-
date "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States,"45 the fourth amendment reasonableness standard requires 
prior judicial approval of electronic surveillance in domestic security 
cases.46 Additionally, the Court ruled that Congress had authority to 
legislate warrant procedures for the executive and judiciary to fol-
low, at least in domestic security cases.47 
The relevance of United States .District Court to foreign security 
cases (ie., cases where threats to national security originate from for-
eign powers or their agents) is two-fold. First, the decision indicates 
that neither the interest in national security nor the interest in indi-
vidual privacy48 is a constitutional absolute, and that the two must 
therefore be balanced in deciding the question of a national security 
exemption from judicial approval of electronic surveillance. Second, 
the case establishes that when prior judicial approval of surveillance 
is constitutionally required (when fourth amendment interests pre-
vail) or constitutionally permissible (when executive functions would 
not be unduly frustrated), Congress may prescribe "reasonable stan-
dards" for the warrant procedure.49 Unless a qualitative constitu-
tional difference between domestic and foreign security cases can be 
established, Congress therefore may legislate appropriate standards 
governing executive conduct and judicial approval of foreign secur-
ity surveillance. so 
Three circuit courts have struggled with the issue left unresolved 
by United States .District Court: Does the President's power to con-
407 U.S. at 315. It is notable that the Court relied in part on citizens' first amendment interests 
of free speech and association as they overlap with fourth amendment privacy; this overlap is 
equally relevant to foreign affairs. See Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth 
Amendment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 976, 987-88 (1974). 
45. 407 U.S. at 310. 
46. 407 U.S. at 314-21, 323-24. 
The Government made four arguments: (1) that the warrant requirement would hinder 
preservation of domestic security; (2) that courts might make errors; (3) that breaches of secur-
ity might occur; and (4) that domestic security surveillance should be included in the adminis-
trative search exemption (in existence between the decisions in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); see 
generally Note, Rationalizing Administrative Searches, 77 MICH. L. REV, 1291 (1979)) since 
such surveillance was primarily for the purpose of obtaining information and not for criminal 
prosecutions. 407 U.S. at 318-19. The Court found these arguments unpersuasive. 407 U.S. at 
319-21. 
47. 407 U.S. at 322-24. See Nessen, Aspects of the Executive's Power over National Security 
Mallers: Secrecy Classifications and Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps, 49 IND. L.J. 399, 411-13 
(1974). 
48. The Court here refers to privacy in the context of the fourth amendment, not in terms 
of a fundamental "right of privacy," see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v, 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
49. 407 U.S. at 322-24. See note 40 supra-, Nessen, supra note 47, at 411-21. 
50. See text at notes 107-17 inji-a for an analysis of constitutional distinctions between 
domestic and foreign affairs. 
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duct foreign affairs allow him to approve warrantless electronic sur-
veillance for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence?51 
In United States v. Brown,52 the Fifth Circuit, relying on its pre-
United States .District Court holding in United States v. C!ay,53 con-
cluded that the President has authority "over and above the Warrant 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment" to order foreign security surveil-
lance.54 In Brown, warrantless wiretaps of an undisclosed party had 
intercepted conversations with black activist H. Rap Brown. After 
examining the wiretap records in camera, the district court judge 
concluded that they contained nothing relevant to Brown's case and 
that they were legal wiretaps made for the purpose of gathering for-
eign intelligence.55 On appeal, Brown contended that the wiretaps 
were illegal and that in camera review was therefore insufficient un-
der Alderman v. United States.56 The Fifth Circuit was not per-
suaded. It affirmed the district court on the basis of the President's 
"inherent power to protect national security in the context of foreign 
affairs."57 
51. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 
(1976); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Ivanov 
v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). 
The Ninth Circuit su=arily adopted the decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits in a 
case challenging the nondisclosure of foreign security surveillance records under the Alderman 
rule. See note 37 supra. The Ninth Circuit made no mention of the D.C. Circuit's opinion. 
United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977) ("For-
eign security wiretaps are a recognized exception to the general warrant requirement and dis-
closure of wiretaps not involving illegal surveillance is within the trial court's discretion"). 
52. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973) (Griffin Bell, J.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974). 
53. 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), revd. on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). 
54. 484 F.2d at 426. 
55. United States v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 531, 537 (E.D. La. 1970). On appeal the Fifth 
Circuit emphasized that Brown's involvement in the surveillance was "happenstance at most." 
484 F.2d at 425. 
United States v. Clay also involved the criminal prosecution of a defendant whose conver-
sations the government had incidentally overheard in the warrantless surveillance of a party 
not involved in the proceedings. The district court judge concluded after in camera review of 
the wiretap that the records were irrelevant to the criminal case and denied disclosure. 430 
F.2d at 166-67. 
56. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). See note 37 supra. 
57. 484 F.2d at 426. Clay and Brown do not persuasively resolve the constitutional issue, 
however, because the Fifth Circuit's balancing test in both cases differs in two important re-
spects from the Supreme Court's weighing of interests in United States District Court. First, in 
Clay the Fifth Circuit "balance[d] the right of the defendant and the national interest." 430 
F.2d at 171 (emphasis added). This particularized balancing, considering only the individual 
defendant before the court (who may not have been the surveillance target), contrasts with 
United States .District Court, where the Supreme Court balanced the national security interest 
with "the needs of citizens [in general] for privacy and free expression." 407 U.S. 297, 315 
(1972). Second, in evaluating the surveillance of an individual defendant, the Fifth Circuit 
prescribed an ex post test of whether a particular search and seizure was reasonable, rather 
than an ex ante test of whether it was reasonable to require the procurement of a warrant for 
the search. Compare note 41 supra, and cases cited therein. The Supreme Court rejected this 
approach for domestic security surveillance in United States .District Court: ''The Fourth 
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The Third Circuit reached a similar result in United States v. 
Butenko.58 In Butenko, the court assessed the legality of a wiretap of 
the defendant's conversations with a Soviet citizen working at the 
Soviet mission to the United Nations. The Soviet employee was sus-
pected of espionage. The Third Circuit rejected the defendant's 
claims under section 605 of the Communications Act of 193459 and 
thus reached the constitutional issue. Emphasizing a strong public 
interest in a judicially unimpaired fl.ow of foreign policy informa-
tion, the Third Circuit held that the surveillance was constitutional 
because it fell within a foreign intelligence gathering exception to the 
warrant requirement.60 The court implied, however, that this excep-
tion might apply only to surveillance of individuals with direct ties to 
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may 
be reasonably exercised." 407 U.S. at 317 (footnote omitted). 
58. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.) (en bane) (5-4 decision), cerl. denied sub nom. Ivanov v. United 
States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). Bulenko was criticized severely in Comment, supra note 10. 
59. 494 F.2d at 598-602. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. Section 605 was ar-
guably applicable since the surveillance preceded the 1968 adoption of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act and its § 2511(3) disclaimer. See notes 28-33 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
60. 494 F.2d at 605. The Bulenko majority purported to balance two constitutional inter-
ests: "the federal government's need to accumulate information concerning activities within 
the United States of foreign powers and the people's right of privacy as embodied in statute 
and the Fourth Amendment." 494 F.2d at 596. Nevertheless, the majority opinion's tenor and 
approach leave little doubt that the majority considered the security interest far more impor-
tant. The majority even suggested that, were it not for United Stoles IJistrict Court, it might 
have held that the President could "act unencumbered by the Fourth Amendment require-
ments of prior judicial approval and probable cause when he is dealing with national security 
matters." 494 F.2d at 602. Instead, the majority characterized the Government's interest as 
"surely weighty" - only a little less than absolute. 494 F.2d at 606. The majority thus con-
trasted the President's near absolute foreign affairs powers with the more limited scope of the 
fourth amendment. To demonstrate the fourth amendment's limitations, the majority pointed 
to four exceptions to the general requirement of judicial approval: an automobile search to 
prevent the transfer of contraband, a police officer's search incidental to a probable cause 
arrest, a police officer's frisk of a detained person believed to be armed and dangerous, and a 
"home visit" by a welfare worker. 494 F.2d at 604-05. Then, ignoring the first three excep-
tions, the majority read the "home visit" exception expansively to create a "public interest" 
exception to the fourth amendment, an exception that included "the efficient operation of the 
Executive's foreign policy-making apparatus." 494 F.2d at 605. A warrant requirement for 
foreign security surveillances, the majority believed, ''would seriously fetter the Executive in 
the performance of his foreign affairs duties" by requiring officers to "interrupt their activities 
and rush to the nearest available magistrate." 494 F.2d at 605. 
The majority carried these arguments beyond their logical limits. First, the believable as-
sumption that requiring prior judicial approval would be undesirable in some exigent circum-
stances does not justify an exception from judicial approval in all foreign security 
surveillances. Second, and more importantly, to imply that the warrant requirement may be 
avoided whenever a public interest to do so exists makes the warrant requirement a constitu-
tional nullity. The framers added the fourth amendment to the Constitution because they 
perceived a strong public interest in the warrant requirement. Constitutional values do not 
become irrelevant whenever they cause inconvenience and inefficiency. See, e.g., United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 321 ("Although some added burden will be 
imposed upon the Attorney General, this inconvenience is justified in a free society to protect 
constitutional values"); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissent• 
ing). 
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foreign governments.61 
In Zweibon v. Mitchell,62 the District of Columbia Circuit be-
came the third federal appellate court to address the scope of the 
President's foreign intelligence gathering power. Zweibon involved a 
civil suit63 against Attorney General John Mitchell and FBI special 
agents for damages resulting from electronic surveillance of the Jew-
ish Defense League's New York headquarters.64 The defendants ad-
mitted that they had conducted the surveillance, but they asserted 
that it was authorized by "the President's ability and constitutional 
authority to conduct the foreign relations of this country."65 It is 
difficult to inf er a clear holding from Zweibon because of the length 
and number of the opinions (the eight circuit judges filed five sepa-
rate opinions) and the interrelated issues of statutory and constitu-
tional violations and remedies. _Nevertheless, the plurality opinion66 
appears to state that, absent exigent circumstances, the President 
must obtain a warrant for all national security surveillances, domes-
tic and foreign, conducted within the United States.67 While the 
three judges who signed the plurality opinion followed the spirit of 
the United States District Court balancing test,68 they recognized that 
their conclusion was largely dictum: 
[W]e need not rest our decision on so broad a holding, since we are 
61. The court indicated that surveillance of international grain dealers or oil companies to 
obtain economic information relevant to U.S. foreign policy would probably be subject to the 
fourth amendment restrictions described in United Stales JJistricl Court. See 494 F.2d at 603 
n.39. 
62. Zweibon v. Mitchell (Zweibon I), 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 
425 U.S. 944 (1976). Zweibon IIis In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), 
which required a jury trial of the "good faith" affirmative defense. Zweibon III, Zweibon v. 
Mitchell, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. applied for, Nos. 79-881, 79-883 (Dec. 7, 1979), 
reversed the district court for the third time. The D.C. Circuit held that the warrant require-
ments of United States District Court and Zweibon I apply retroactively and that compensation 
may be sought under the Bivens doctrine, see note 63 i,!fra, but not under Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, see text at notes 28-30 supra. This 
holding partially reversed Zweibon I, and was first advocated in Case Comment, supra note 
31, at 792-801. For a comprehensive discussion of Zweibon I, see Note, The Fourth Amend-
ment and Judicial Review of Foreign Intelligence Wiretapping-. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 45 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 55 (1976); Case Comment, supra note 31. 
63. See Bivens v. Six Un.known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal cause 
of action exists to remedy violations of the fourth amendment). 
64. Jewish Defense League members had taken part in activities directed against Soviet 
officials and installations in the United States ranging from peaceful demonstrations to acts of 
violence, including bombings. Soviet officials made repeated and vigorous protests to the 
United States government; they threatened a chilling of international relations and retaliation 
against American citizens living in Moscow. Fearing these international consequences and 
hoping to prevent further criminal acts by the JDL, the Attorney General approved a warrant• 
less wiretap. 516 F.2d at 608-1 l. 
65. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 363 F. Supp. 936, 942 (D.D.C. 1973). 
66. Circuit Judges Wright, Leventhal, and Robinson and Chief Judge Bazelon joined in 
the opinion (Chief Judge Bazelon dissented in part). 
67. 516 F.2d at 651. 
68. 516 F.2d at 628-51. 
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only presented with a case in which foreign thteats of retaliation 
against individual citizens abroad were provoked by the actions of the 
domestic organization which was subsequently wiretapped, rather than 
a case in which the wiretapped organization acted in collaboration 
with, or as the agent of, the foreign power from which the threat ema-
nated. 69 
The remaining four judges also recognized that the plurality's broad 
holding was unnecessary: two declined comment on the foreign se-
curity exception to the warrant requirement, and two others con-
. eluded the plurality's holding was incorrect.70 Although it purported 
to resolve the issue of foreign intelligence surveillance, the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision left things even more uncertain than United States 
.District Court.11 As in United States .District Court, the court seem-
ingly invited Congress to delineate the appropriate procedures (and 
perhaps the substantive law as well) which the decision failed to es-
tablish. 72 
The Brown, Butenko, and Zweibon cases illustrate the legal con-
fusion existing at the time Congress attempted to reconcile foreign 
intelligence gathering with individual liberty by enacting the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.73 This Note does not seek to resolve 
69. 516 F.2d at 651. 
70. Judge Robb believed the case was controlled by the domestic security requirements of 
United States .District Court; he therefore declined comment on the claimed foreign security 
warrant exception. 516 F.2d at 688 (Robb, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Jewish De• 
fense League is a domestic organization"). Judge McGowan argued that Title III of the Omni• 
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 controlled the case. He also refused to address 
the issue left unresolved in United States .District Court. 516 F.2d at 681, 683-87 (McGowan, 
J., concurring in the judgment) ("Judge Wright's discussion of the general problem of whether 
there should be a foreign security exception to the constitutional warrant requirement, though 
a scholarly effort of extraordinary proportions, seems to me unnecessary"). 
Judges Wilkey and MacKinnon concurred in the plurality's finding that the wiretaps were 
pursuant to the President's foreign affairs powers, and also in the holding that the warrantless 
surveillance was nevertheless a violation of the fourth amendment. 516 F.2d at 689, 706 
(Wilkey and MacKinnon, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Neither, however, 
accepted the broad dictum of the plurality that all foreign intelligence surveillances required 
judicial warrants. They suggested (equally in dictum) that warrantless surveillances of foreign 
agents and collaborators - as distinguished from individuals or domestic organizations antag• 
onistic to foreign powers - would be constitutional. 516 F.2d at 705, 706. 
71. Compare 516 F.2d 594, 658-59 with 407 U.S. 297, 322-23. 
72. See 516 F.2d at 658-59. 
73. This issue has arisen in several other cases. The Ninth Circuit endorsed the holdings of 
the Third and Fifth Circuits in Butenko and Brown without discussion in United States v. 
Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977). See note 51 supra. 
The Fourth Circuit, in a case decided after the FISA's passage but arising from events that 
took place before the Act took effect, also declared a warrant unnecessary for electronic sur• 
veillance when the "primary purpose" of the surveillance is to gather or protect foreign intelli• 
gence information. United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1978), ajfd. sub 
nom. United States v. Truong, No. 78-5176 (4th Cir. July 17, 1980). See also Jabara v. Kelley, 
476 F. Supp. 561,576 (E.D. Mich. 1979); United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 
1971). On the other hand, the District of Columbia District Court accepted and expanded the 
holding of Zweibon I in Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 159 (D,D.C. 
1976) ("[A]bsent exigent circumstances, prior judicial authorization in the form of a warrant 
based on probable cause is required for electronic surveillance by the Army of American citi-
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whether, in the absence of legislation, the President possesses consti-
tutional power to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveil-
lance. 74 That task has been attempted elsewhere.75 Nor is it 
necessary to resolve that problem. If Butenko is correct and the 
President has extensive surveillance power in the absence of legisla-
tion, the relevant issue is whether he retains that power after passage 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. On the other hand, if 
the Zweibon plurality is correct and no foreign intelligence warrant 
exception exists, the question remains whether the specific require-
ments and procedures of the Act unconstitutionally restrain presi-
dential power. Both questions involve issues of congressional 
authority to enact the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and of 
judicial ability to carry out its requirements. To resolve these under-
lying issues, it will first be necessary to describe the standards and 
procedures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in greater 
detail. 
II. THE PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act employs detailed war-
rant application and authorization procedures to prevent indiscrimi-
nate use of electronic surveillance.76 The Act calls upon the Chief 
zens or organizations located overseas when there is no evidence of collaboration with or ac-
tion on behalf of a foreign power"). The Second Circuit successfully avoided the issue in 
United States v. Ajlouny, No. 80-1047 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 1980). 
74. See text at notes 34-51 supra. 
75. See, e.g., Lacovara, supra note 10; Nesson, supra note 47; Case Co=ent, supra note 
31; Note, supra note ll; Note, supra note 62; Note, supra note 44; Co=ent, supra note 10; 
Note, supra note 10; Note, Government Monitoring of International Electronic Communications: 
National Security Agency Watch List Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 429 (1978); Note, The Fourth Amendment and Executive Authorization of Warran/less For-
eign Security Surveillance, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 397 (1978). 
76. Section 101(1) of the FISA defines electronic surveillances as consisting of four par-
tially overlapping categories: 
(I) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the 
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a 
particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are 
acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in 
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required 
for law enforcement purposes; 
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the 
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the 
consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States; 
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance de-
vice of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforce-
ment purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the 
United States; or 
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in 
the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio 
communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes. 
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Justice to designate seven district court judges to serve overlapping 
terms on a special court that hears warrant requests.77 The Chief 
Justice also designates three. federal judges to form a special court 
with jurisdiction to review the denial of warrant applications.78 If 
See generally Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH, L. 
REv. 154 (1977) (discussing the "reasonable expectation of privacy"). 
This definition does not encompass all that is commonly considered electronic surveillance 
for foreign intelligence purposes. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) is capa• 
ble of intercepting all electronic communications to and from the United States. The NSA can 
sort out these communications and identify communications to, from, or about any specific 
targeted individual or about any specified subject matter. E.g., Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 11, 
12 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), denying rehearing en bane of Halkin v. 
Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL Qp. 
ERATIONS WITH REsPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, BOOK Ill: FOREION 
AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, s. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 739-40 (1976). Appar-
ently, the FISA gives the NSA complete discretion to monitor any and all international radio 
communications (including all international telephone conversations transmitted by satellite); 
interception of communications to or from untargeted individuals (for example, communica-
tions that the NSA distinguishes on the basis of subject matter) is not electronic surveillance 
under the Act's definitions. See FISA § I0I(f). Some of the NSA's activities are therefore 
unaffected by the Act's standards and procedures. FISA § IOI(f); see Note, Government 
Monitoring of International Electronic Communications: National Security Agency Watch Lisi 
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 75, at 461 n.244. In addition, the section of 
the Act that calls for the destruction of information from "unintentional" acquisition of radio 
communications applies only "if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within 
the United States," thereby exempting some of NSA's activities from its strictures. See also 
note 89 and accompanying text infta. 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld a Government claim of 
"state secrets" privilege, effectively dismissing a suit claiming infringement of fourth amend-
ment rights by the NSA. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1978), rehearing en bane 
denied, 598 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court did not consider the impact of the FISA on 
the plaintiJfs claims since the suit had been filed before the Act's passage. Halkins v. Helms, 
598 F.2d at 18 n.32 (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). 
77. FISA, § 103(a),(d). Chief Justice Burger-made the first appointments on May 18, 1979. 
The first appointees to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court were: Judge Albert V. 
Bryan, Jr. (E.D. Va.), seven-year term; Judge Frederick B. Lacey (D.N.J.), six-year term; 
Judge Lawrence Warren Pierce (S.D.N.Y.), five-year term; Judge Frank J. McGarr (N.D. Ill.), 
four-year term; Judge George L. Hart, Jr. (D.D.C.), three-year term; Judge James H. Meridith 
(E.D. Mo.), two-year term; and Judge Thomas Jamison MacBride (E.D. Cal), one-year term. 
Appointments Announced: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts, 11 THE THIRD BRANCH, 
No. 5, May 1979, at 7. 
The conference report indicates that these judges will serve on rotation in the District of 
Columbia with at least two on duty at any given time. H.R. REP. No. 1720, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 26-27, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4048, 4055-56. The court has 
nationwide jurisdiction and is placed in one location to minimize security risks. 124 CoNo. 
REc. Hl2,538-39 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Murphy of Illinois). In Senate 
hearings, Attorney General Bell expressed his faith that the judiciary is not a security risk, 
calling the judiciary ''the most leakproof branch of the Government." Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and 
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Hearings on S. 1566]. 
78. FISA § 103(b). The first appointees to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
Review were: Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. (3d Cir.), seven-year term; Judge James E. 
Barrett (10th Cir.), five-year term; Judge George Edward MacKinnon (D.C. Cir.), three-year 
term. Appointments Announced· Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts, 11 THE THIRD 
BRANCH, No. 5, May 1979, at 7. 
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this special appellate court denies a warrant, the Government may 
petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 
The Act's warrant application and authorization procedures re-
quire executive branch officials to state in writing the circumstances 
justifying each warrant. They require the judge hearing the applica-
tion to state in writing the reasons for granting or denying each re-
quest. 79 Before issuing an order approving surveillance, the judge 
must conduct an ex parte proceeding to ensure that the application 
has the approval of the attorney general, 80 that it contains all the 
necessary statements and certifications, 81 and, most importantly, that 
there exists "probable cause to believe that - (A) the target of the 
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power 
. . . ; and (B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic 
surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."82 
79. In general, a warrant application for foreign intelligence surveillance requires the fol-
lowing: 
(I) the approval of the Attorney General based upon his finding that the application satis-
fies the statutory criteria, FISA § 104(a); 
(2) the identity of the federal officer requesting the warrant, FISA § 104(a)(l); 
(3) the identity of the target, if known, or a description of the target, FISA § 104(a)(3); 
( 4) a statement of the facts and circumstances used to justify the belief that the target is a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the premises targeted are used by a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, FISA § 104(a)(4); 
(5) a statement of the proposed "minimization procedures," FISA § 104(a)(5) (''Minimiza-
tion procedures" defined in section IOI(h), are means of limiting the acquisition, retention, and 
dissemination of information obtained from electronic surveillance which does not relate to 
the proper objects of the surveillance. Compare FISA §§ I0I(h), 106, with Berger v. United 
States, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); see generally Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (Title III 
minimization procedures), and Fishman, The "Minimization" Requirement in Electronic Sur-
veillance: Title III, the Fourth Amendment, and the IJreadScott Decision, 8 AM. U. L. REv. 315 
(1979)); 
(6) a description of the information sought and the type of co=unications to be targeted, 
FISA § 104(a)(6); 
(7) a certification by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or by 
another officer designated by the President from among those executive officers with duties in 
the area of national security of defense who are appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, that: (a) the information sought is foreign intelligence information, (b) 
the purpose of the proposed surveillance is to obtain that information, and (c) the information 
cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques, FISA § 104(a)(7); see Exec. 
Order No. 12,139, 44 Fed. Reg. 30,311 (May 23, 1979); 
(8) a statement of the method of surveillance and whether physical entry is required, FISA 
§ 104(a)(8), see note 86 infra; 
(9) a statement of the facts relating to previous warrant applications for surveillance di-
rected at the same target, FISA § 104(a)(9); and 
(10) a statement of the time period for which surveillance is requested, FISA § 104(a)(IO). 
80. FISA § 105(a)(l), (2). 
81. FISA § 105(a)(5). 
82. FISA § 105(a)(3). By requiring a showing of probable cause to believe that a targeted 
individual is an agent of a foreign power, the Act effectively requires probable cause to believe 
that a criminal law has been or is about to be violated before a United States person may be 
placed under surveillance. See note 83 infra; FISA § IOI(b) (defining "agent of a foreign 
power"). Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (requiring a nexus between the 
object of search and seizure and the alleged criminal behavior). 
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Even higher standards of review are imposed if the target of the 
requested surveillance is a "United States person":83 the judge must 
83. Under the Act "United States person" includes United States citizens, permanent resi-
dent alie~, and groups whose membership includes a "substantial number'' of United States 
citizens and permanent resident aliens. FISA § IOI(i). The Act provides that any person, 
other than a United States person, who "acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a 
foreign power" or as a member of an international terrorist group, or who is believed to engage 
in clandestine intelligence activities in the United States on behalf of a foreign power may be 
treated as an "agent of a foreign power." FISA § IOI(b)(l). In addition, a United States 
person who knowingly aids, abets, engages in, or conspires to engage in clandestine intelli-
gence activities, international terrorism, or sabotage on behalf of a foreign power also qualifies 
as an agent of a foreign power, but only when his or her activities involve or may involve the 
violation of a criminal statute. FISA § 10l(b)(2). Among the federal criminal statutes most 
likely to be involved are assault on a foreign official, 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1976); bribery of public 
officials, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976); United States officer or employee acting as agent of foreign 
principal, 18 U.S.C. § 219 (1976); civil disorder, 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1976); congressional assassi-
nation, kidnapping, and assault, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1976); falsification of military, naval, or offi-
cial passes, 18 U.S.C. § 499 (1976); escape ofprisioners of war or enemy aliens, 18 U.S.C, § 757 
(1976); gathering, transmitting or losing defense information, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1976); gathering 
or delivering defense information to aid foreign government, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1976); other acts 
of espionage or disclosure of classified information, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792, 795-799 (1976); extortion 
and threats, 18 U.S.C. §§ 871-73, 876-78 (1976); interstate transportation of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922 (1976); various interferences with foreign governments or foreign affairs, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 951-970 (1976); destruction of government communications lines, 18 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976); 
piracy, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1661 (1976); presidential assassination, kidnapping and assault, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1751-52 (1976); disclosure of confidential information, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976); con-
cealment, removal, or mutilation of public records, 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976); sabotage, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2151-2157 (1976); treason, sedition, and subversive activities, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2381-
2391 (1976); illegal exportation of war materials, 22 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); and offenses against 
neutrality, 22 U.S.C. §§ 461-465 (1976). The Act defines international terrorism as "activites 
[involving] violent acts or acts dangerous to human life" that violate the criminal laws of the 
United States or of any State, or would violate a criminal law if committed within the proper 
jurisdiction, and that appear to be intended to coerce a civilian population or influence govern-
ment policy. FISA § IOI(c). 
As a result of these definitions, foreign embassy officers and employees, but not United 
States citizens, may be subject to surveillance without any prior indication of potential crimi-
nal conduct. The statute provides that no United States person may be considered an agent of 
a foreign power solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment. FISA 
§ I05(a)(3)(A). 
An agent of a foreign power, or a foreign power itself, may also be the subject of electronic 
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information. FISA § 102(b), The FISA defines for-
eign intelligence information as: 
(I) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, 
the ability of the United States to protect against -
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power; 
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power; or 
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a for• 
eign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or 
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if 
concerning a United States person is necessary to -
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
(B) the conduct of foreign affairs of the United States. 
FISA § IOI(e). The Act therefore provides a stricter standard for the surveillance of United 
States persons than for the surveillance of foreign nationals. Note, however, that if the FISA 
affords less protection to foreign nationals than the fourth amendment, the government must 
comply with the stricter fourth amendment standard. The ''people" protected by the fourth 
amendment are all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See, e.g., 
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923) (alien may assert exclusion-
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find that the certifications of the executive officer are not clearly er-
roneous. The judge must base this finding on the statements made 
by the executive officer to support the certifications and on any other 
information the judge believes is necessary.84 If these requirements 
are satisfied, an order approving the surveillance for a limited pe-
riod85 will issue.86 
The FISA waives the warrant requirement in three situations. 87 
First, the Attorney General may unilaterally authorize electronic 
surveillance in emergencies if judicial proceedings would unaccept-
ably delay surveillance. 88 Second, federal officials need not obtain a 
warrant to intercept communications "exclusively between or among 
foreign powers" or to acquire "technical intelligence, other than the 
spoken communications of individuals, from property or premises 
under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power . . . ."89 
I 
ary rule in deportation proceeding); cf. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (Court 
assumed that aliens, even those who had entered the country illegally and were engaged in 
espionage, were entitled to full fourth amendment protection; search made incidental to valid 
deportation arrest; conviction affirmed). This Note does not consider whether the statute's 
standards for foreign nationals meet fourth amendment requirements. Nevertheless, the 
reader should be aware that the Act d9es not require a showing of probable cause to suspect 
criminal activity before surveillance of foreign nationals may commence. See FISA 
§§ I0I(b)(l), 105(a)(3), and note 82 supra. 
84. FISA § 105(a)(5). The statements of the executive officer must support the conclusions 
that "(i) the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence information designated; and 
(ii) such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques." 
FISA § 104(a)(7)(E). The judge may require other necessary information for his or her deter-
minations. FISA § 104(d). In Senate hearings Defense Secretary Harold Brown expressed a 
concern that the word "necessary" in section 104(d) - which allows the judge to require the 
government to furnish additional information to support its application - might be inter-
preted to mean "substantially more than just 'useful' or 'helpful.'" Hearings on S. 1566, supra 
note 77, at 55. The legislative history neither confirms nor denies this possible interpretation. 
Congress may have chosen the "clearly erroneous" standard over a "probable cause" stan-
dard for these factual findings in deference to executive claims of expertise in "highly sophisti-
cated matters of national defense, foreign affairs, and counterintelligence." Id. at 15 
(statement of Attorney General Bell). 
85. Judicial orders may approve surveillance of individuals for up to 90 days; surveillance 
of foreign powers may be approved for up to one year. FISA § 105( d)(l ). Extensions of cur-
rent warrants "may be granted on the same basis as an original order upon application for an 
extension and new findings" for similarly limited periods of time. FISA § 105(d)(2), (3). 
86. FISA § l0S(a). The order approving an electronic surveillance must explicitly specify 
whether physical entry will be used to effect the surveillance. FISA § 105(b)(l)(D). This ex-
plicit approval of physical entry is not required by the fourth amendment, nor is it necessary 
under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 
(1976). Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255-59 (1979). 
87. In addition to these three exceptions, FISA § 105(f) allows non-targeted surveillance 
for equipment tests and personnel training when no alternative means of testing or training 
exists, provided that no information so obtained is retained or disclosed. 
88. FISA § 105(e). This section also provides that the Attorney General or his designee 
must file a warrant application with a judge within twenty-four hours of such an emergency 
authorization. If the application is denied, the surveillance must be terminated and any col-
lected information may not be disclosed. 
89. FISA § 102(a)(l)(A). The Attorney General must certify that there is no substantial 
likelihood that a United States person would be a party to any acquired communications. A 
certification of the surveillance is filed with the statutory court, under seal to protect the se-
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Third, the warrant requirement is waived during the first fifteen days 
following a congressional declaration of war.90 This exemption al-
lows Congress time to consider any amendments to the Act that 
"may be appropriate during a wartime emergency."91 
In passing the FISA, Congress rejected any claim of inherent 
presidential power to conduct foreign security surveillance.92 Al-
though the majority of the House-Senate Conference Committee be-
lieved that the President possesses no inherent power to conduct 
wiretapping or electronic surveillance without court approval, it left 
the issue for final resolution by the Supreme Court: 
The conferees agree that the establishment by this act of exclusive 
means by which the President may conduct electronic surveillance 
does not foreclose a different decision by the Supreme Court. The in-
tent of the conferees is to apply the standard set forth in Justice Jack-
son's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case: "When a President 
takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Con-
gress, his power is at the lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his 
own Constitutional power minus any Constitutional power of Con-
crecy of the surveillance. FISA § 102(a)(3). No judicial approval of this specialized surveil• 
lance is required, and the certification remains sealed, unless: (I) a district court must 
determine the legality of the surveillance, FISA § 102(a)(3)(B) (a district court must consider 
in camera the application's validity if a party seeks to introduce surveillance information as 
evidence in a trial, hearing, or other court proceeding, FISA § 106(c), (d), and (f), or if any 
aggrieved person moves to suppress evidence obtained or derived from such surveillance, 
FISA § 106(e), (f)); or (2) the surveillance picks up the communications of United States per-
sons, FISA §§ IOI(h)(4), 102(a)(3)(A). In the latter case, the information may not be used for 
any purpose and must be destroyed within the twenty-four hours unless court approval of the 
original surveillance is obtained. FISA § 10l(h)(4). 
The advanced electronic surveillance permitted by§ 102(a)(I)(A) is carried on exclusively 
by the Nation?l Security Agency (NSA); the exemption is therefore referred to as the NSA 
exemption. See H.R. REP. No. 1720, supra note 7, at 24, reprinted in (1978] U.S. CODE CONG, 
& Ao. NEWS 4048, 4053; Berlow, supra note 7, at 2964-65. 
90. FISA § 111. 
91. H.R. REP. No. 1720, supra note 7, at 34, reprinted in (1978] U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 4048, 4063. 
92. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 77, at 2, 14-15 (statements of Senator Ken• 
nedy and Attorney General Bell). 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 explicitly disclaimed 
any intent to affect the President's power in national security surveillance. See Omnibus 
Crime Control jmd Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2511(3), 82 Stat. 214 (previ-
ously codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976)). The FISA repealed this disclaimer contained in 
Title III and aniended the Safe Streets Act to provide in part: 
[T]he Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which 
electronic surveillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire and oral communica-
tions (to obtain foreign intelligence information] may be conducted. 
FISA § 201. The House version had designated the bill as "the exclusive statutory means" of 
foreign intelligence surveillance. H.R. 7308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(b)(f), 124 CONG, REC, 
H9273 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (emphasis added). The word "statutory" was then deleted in 
conference. H.R. REP. No. 1720, supra note 7, at 35, reprinted in (1978) U.S. CODE CONG, & 
Ao. NEWS 4048, 4064. Despite a vigorous argument of unconstitutionality, led by Representa-
tive McClory of Illinois, see Dissenting Views, supra note 9, at HI 1,683-85; 124 CONG. REC, 
Hl2,535-37, H12,540-42 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978), the Senate adopted the conference substitute 
by a voice vote, 124 CONG. REC. S17,884 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1978), and the House of Representa-
tives by a vote of226 to 176, 124 CoNG. REc. Hl2,542-43 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978). 
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gress over the matter." Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 637 (1952).93 
The remainder of this Note assesses whether Congress found a con-
stitutional means to legislate a judicial role in foreign security sur-
veillance. 
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act raises difficult separa-
tion of powers issues. The Act is vulnerable to constitutional chal-
lenge as an intrusion by both Congress and the judiciary into the 
President's power to conduct foreign affairs. Two challenges to the 
Act's constitutionality seem particularly troublesome. First, the Act 
may exceed congressional po~er to interfere with inherent and ex-
clusive presidential powers.94 Second, the Act may require the judi-
ciary to review presidential foreign policy decisions - a task beyond 
judicial competence.95 
Before a court can review either of these challenges to the Act's 
constitutionality, it must decide that it has the power to do so. The 
recent case of Goldwater v. Carter96 may indicate that federal courts 
would not assert that power. In Goldwater, the Supreme Court dis-
missed a Senator's complaint that President Carter lacked the consti-
tutional power to abrogate a mutual defense treaty between the 
United States and Taiwan without Senate approval. Justice Rehn-
quist's plurality opinion in Goldwater suggests a sweeping applica-
tion of the political question doctrine to all foreign affairs 
controversies. Justice Rehnquist began his opinion: 
I am of the view that the basic question presented by the petitioners 
in this case is "political" and therefore nonjusticiable because it in-
volves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's 
foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is 
authorized to negate the action of the President.97 
Justice Rehnquist did not declare whether his opinion was meant 
to overrule Justice Brennan's dictum in Baker v. Carr that "not every 
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judi-
cial cognizance."98 That possibility, however, seems unlikely and 
untenable. Justice Rehnquist's political question dismissal relied es-
sentially on two grounds: the Constitution's silence on treaty termi-
93. H.R. REP. No. 1720, supra note 1, at 35 (footnote omitted), reprinted in [1978] U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4048, 4064. 
94. See, e.g., Dissenting Views, supra note 9, at Hll,683-84. 
95. See, e.g., Hearings on R.R. 7308 Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1978) (statement of Laurence H. Silberman). 
96. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
97. 444 U.S. at 1002 (plurality opinion). 
98. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
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nation99 and the resources available to coequal branches to settle 
their disputes politically.100 But these grounds are open to serious 
dispute. Justice Powell correctly pointed out that interstitial analysis 
is as much the Court's duty as textual analysis; neither inquiry neces-
sarily demands "special competence or information beyond the 
reach of the Judiciary."101 Justice Powell also cited the "Court's 
willingness on previous occasions to decide whether one branch of 
our government has impinged upon the power of another."102 
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist's expansive interpretation of the po-
litical question doctrine has never been endorsed by a majority of 
the Supreme Court. 103 Even if a majority of the Court eventually 
embraces the plurality opinion in Goldwater, it is unlikely that the 
political question doctrine would be expanded to reach all foreign 
affairs questions. Professor Henkin's observation that "[t]he 
Supreme Court has never invoked the political question doctrine to 
dismiss an individual's claim that a foreign relations action deprived 
him of constitutional rights" 104 remains true. Since the PISA at-
tempts to strike a balance that protects both national security and 
individual rights, its constitutionality falls within the category of 
questions which Henkin correctly identifies as non-political. The 
Court should not leave individual rights to the unlimited discretion 
of the political branches merely because the political action is 
clothed in the garb of foreign affairs. 105 It therefore seems reason-
99. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist thought 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 443 (1939), was "directly analogous." Coleman asked whether a 
state could ratify a constitutional amendment that it had previously rejected. Chief Justice 
Hughes pointed to the Constitution's silence on the rejection of proposed constitutional 
amendments in declaring the issue a political question, 307 U.S. at 450 (plurality opinion); 
Justice Rehnquist pointed to the Constitution's silence on treaty abrogation, 444 U.S. at 1003 
(plurality opinion). 
100. 444 U.S. at 1004 (plurality opinion). Professor Henkin, several years before Goldwater 
v. Carter, argued that Congress and the President could not sue each other for alleged consti• 
tutional deficiencies. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 208 (1972). 
IOI. 444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell offered a hypothetical case: 
"Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a foreign country and an-
nounced that it would go into effect despite its rejection by the Senate." According to Justice 
Powell, Justice Rehnquist's analysis would classify this dispute a political question, even 
though Powell believed the hypothetical dispute would be clearly justiciable and, except for 
being an easier case on the merits, indistinguishable for political question purposes from the 
controversy before the Court. 444 U.S. at 999-1000. 
102. 444 U.S. at 1001 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. I, 138 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 
279 U.S. 655, 676-78 (1929); and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), as examples. 
103. The doctrine was explicitly rejected by Justice Powell, 444 U.S. at 998, and by Justice 
Brennan, 444 U.S. at 1006-07. (Justice Brennan authored the Supreme Court's decision in 
Balcer v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). Justices Blackmun, White, and Marshall expressed no 
opinion on the justiciability issue. 444 U.S. at 996, 1006. 
104. L. HENKIN, supra note 100,.at 485 n.6. 
105. q. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132, 1145 (D.D.C. 1979) (selective deportation 
program for Iranian, students violated equal protection), revd., 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980). 
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able for the federal courts, if called upon, to review the constitution-
ality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
A. Congressional Power to Regulate Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Within the United States 
The President has the constitutional power to conduct foreign af-
fairs.106 During debate in the House of Representatives, several 
Congressmen vigorously argued that the FISA would improperly 
limit that power. Their argument rested on two contentions: first, 
that foreign-intelligence gathering within the United States is part of 
the conduct of foreign affairs; and second, that the FISA exceeds the 
scope of congressional power to regulate the conduct of foreign af-
fairs. Careful analysis reveals that while the first contention may be 
true, the second is incorrect. 
The conduct of foreign intelligence surveillance within the 
United States may fall within either the domestic or the foreign af-
fairs powers of the President. If this surveillance is a domestic affair, 
Congress has plenary power to regulate it. 107 On the other hand, if 
this surveillance is a foreign affair, Congress may have considerably 
less regulatory authority, and the question of whether the FISA ex-
ceeds that limited authority becomes relevant. 
Although important consequences may flow from the distinction 
between foreign and domestic affairs powers, the Supreme Court has 
offered little guidance in discerning whether a given problem in-
volves foreign or domestic affairs. "For constitutional lawyers as for 
others, the line between domestic and foreign affairs is increasingly 
fluid and uncertain, sometimes unreal, always at most a division of 
emphasis and degree." 108 Two landmark cases illustrate this uncer-
tainty in drawing a line between domestic and foreign affairs. 
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 109 the Supreme 
Court held that a congressional resolution authorizing President 
Roosevelt to embargo arms to countries at war in the Chaco and to 
impose criminal penalties for violations of the embargo was not an 
improper delegation oflegislative power. 110 This decision contrasted 
sharply with the Court's contemporaneous decisions striking down 
excessive delegations of legislative power to the executive in domes-
tic affairs. 111 The different outcomes, according to Justice Suther-
106. See text at notes 119-21 infra, and notes 119 & 121 infra. 
107. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ l. 
108. L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 8-9. See also Manning, The Congress, the Executive and 
Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 306 (1977); Nye, Independence and In-
terdependence, 22 FOREIGN POL. 129 (1976). 
109. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
110. 299 U.S. at 322. 
11 l. See, e.g:, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
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land, were the result of "fundamental differences between the 
powers of the federal government in . . . foreign and external affairs 
and those in ... domestic or internal affairs."112 But the Court 
failed to explain when a given action involved foreign affairs; it sim-
ply assumed that an arms embargo implicated the foreign affairs 
powers. 
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 113 the Court held 
President Truman's wartime seizure of the steel mills invalid as an 
improper executive exercise of legislative power vested in Congress 
by Article I of the Constitution. 114 Despite the President's claim that 
the seizure was necessary to avert a strike that would have 
threatened the national defense, 115 the Court apparently treated the 
seizure as a domestic affair. 116 Once again, no clear principle for 
distinguishing foreign from domestic affairs emerged from the 
Court's opinion. 
Curtiss- Wright and Youngstown Sheet & Tube off er little explicit 
guidance as to whether foreign intelligence surveillance within the 
United States is foreign or domestic. Like an arms embargo or a 
wartime plant seizure, this surveillance has both domestic and for-
eign impact, and is motivated by foreign policy objectives. Without 
a clear indication from the Court, one can only observe that at least 
in some circumstances - such as surveillance of a foreign spy within 
the United States - foreign intelligence surveillance under the PISA 
intuitively seems more foreign than domestic. 117 Relying on that in-
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 431-32 
(1935). 
112. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936). 
113. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See generally M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE 
CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977). 
114. Article I, § I provides: 
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, 
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. 
115. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 14 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952), reprinted in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 589. 
I 16. 343 U.S. 579, 585-86, 587-88; 343 U.S. at 597-607 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see L. 
HENKIN, supra note I 00, at 340 n.11; Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President 
and the Supreme Court, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 141, 175 (1952). 
117. One could make a strong case to counter this intuition. Curtiss-Wright might be dis-
tinguished from Youngstown Sheet & Tube on the basis of congressional authorization; if Con-
gress concurs in the President's invocation of inherent foreign affairs powers (as in Curtiss-
Wright), the Court may categorize the matter as foreign; if Congress opposes the action (as in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube), the Court may label it domestic. The point is that an action taken 
under the foreign affairs power may invoke the unenumerated powers of sovereignty; the 
Court is perhaps less hesitant to provide this extra-constitutional authority when the President 
and Congress concur. Under this analysis, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act qualifies 
as domestic legislation, not as congressional usurpation of the President's foreign affairs pow-
ers, because Congress has explicitly circumscribed the Preident's authority rather than approv-
ing the President's warrantless surveillance activities. 
Another distinction that makes the FISA appear domestic is concern for individual liber-
ties. When the President's action threatens individual rights (as in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 
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tuition, and thus assuming that foreign-intelligence gathering within 
the United States is part of the conduct of foreign affairs, the ques-
tion of who may control the federal government's extensive powers 
in this area remains. 
The allocation of foreign affairs powers between the President 
and Congress is not clearly defi.ned.118 The President exercises pow-
ers textually committed to him by the Constitution, 119 as well as 
powers implied from these textual assigm:µents and powers inherent 
in national sovereignty. The President alone exercises some of the 
textually committed powers, such as making tactical decisions in 
troop deployment, 120 and some of the textually implied powers, such 
as recognizing or withdrawing recognition from foreign govem-
ments.121 But Congress draws foreign affairs powers from these 
three sources as well, and presidential powers are not always exclu-
sive. Where congressional and presidential authority overlap, con-
gressional power often controls if asserted.122 
which, according to Justice Douglas, 343 U.S. at 631-32, involved an unconstitutional taking of 
property), the Court seems reluctant to ground presidential authority in extra-constitutional 
foreign affairs powers. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 99. Since warrantless surveillances 
clearly implicate personal liberties, this is a second reason to characterize the FISA as domes-
tic. 
However strong the arguments that the FISA should be considered domestic legislation for 
purposes of constitutional analysis, the ambiguous legal distinction between foreign and do-
mestic affairs precludes a conclusion of congressional authority based on this argument alone. 
This Note therefore analyzes congressional power in its weakest light - under the assumption 
that the FISA regulates foreign affairs. 
118. The "modem" view of separation of powers does not contemplate a distinct, unalter-
able division of functions among totally independent branches of government, see, e.g., 
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 
190-91 (1881), but adopts a more flexible and pragmatic approach, see, e.g., Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 441-43 (1977); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 
U.S. at 209 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§§ 2:2-:6 (2d ed. 1978). The flexible approach was first suggested in the Federalist Papers, THE 
FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison), and later by Mr. Justice Story, J. 
STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 525 (5th ed. M. 
Bigelow 1905). 
119. The President is Co=ander in Chief of the armed forces, U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 
I; he makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2, cl. 2; he 
nominates and appoints ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate, U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2; and he receives ambassadors and other public ministers, U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 3. 
120. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 51-54, 107-08; c.f. Dacosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 
(2d Cir. 1973) (court lacked power to review presidential decision to mine North Vietnamese 
ports and harbors). 
121. This power is implied from the President's power to appoint ambassadors, U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and more directly from his authority to receive ambassadors and other 
public ministers, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. E.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-30 
(1942); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). 
122. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (footnotes omitted): 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twi-
light in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution 
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Congress can muster authority to regulate foreign intelligence 
surveillance from two sources: its share of the powers inherent in 
national sovereignty, and its legislative powers under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause of the Constitution. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice 
Sutherland first theorized that some of the federal government's for-
eign affairs powers are inherent in national sovereignty rather than 
derived from the enumerated powers constitutionally delegated to 
the federal government by the states. 123 Although Justice Sutherland 
suggested that many of the extra-constitutional foreign affairs pow-
ers belong to the President, 124 at least some of these powers of sover-
is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, 
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives 
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law, 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will 
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his constitu-
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can 
sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclu-
sive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by 
our constitutional system. 
On occasion Congress, with Supreme Court approval, has even totally deprived the execu-
tive of specific means of accomplishing his foreign policy objectives. For example, in Little v. 
Barreme (The "Flying Fish"), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.), the Court 
held that congressional action authorizing the President to order seizure of American vessels 
bound to a French port thereby precluded the seizure of any American vessel bound from a 
French port. Without this legislation the President, as Commander in Chief, might have em-
powered the Navy to seize all American vessels bound either to or from a French port during 
the undeclared war with France. 
123. 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Sutherland had special interest in foreign relations, As a 
United States Senator he had been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His 
early lectures and writings anticipated the foreign/domestic distinction he propounded in Cur-
tiss-Wright. See G. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 24-47, 
116-26 (1919); G. SUTHERLAND, THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS OF THE NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT, S. Doc. No. 417, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). For a history and criticism of 
Sutherland's views, see Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Suth-
erland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973). 
124. 299 U.S. at 319. Justice Sutherland's statement was dictum, of course; the result in 
Curtiss-Wright did not depend on where the non-textual foreign affairs powers were placed 
because both branches had acted concurrently. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Sutherland's sugges• 
tion is supported only by the more limited statement of then-Congressman John Marshall that 
"[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representa-
tive with foreign nations." IO ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). This position only gives the 
President exclusive power to communicate with foreign governments. Of course, from his po-
sition of national spokesman the President necessarily "make(s] foreign policy" as he "con-
duct[s] foreign relations." L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 47. This, however, does not imply 
that foreign policymaking is exclusively presidential. As Professor Henkin points out, "[t]he 
Court has never considered how the powers inherent in national sovereignty are divided 
among the branches." Id. at 324 n.28. Furthermore, at least some of these powers have been 
validly exercised by Congress. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958) (''To deny 
the power of Congress to enact the legislation challenged here [regulating "the relations of the 
United States with foreign countries"] would be to disregard the constitutional allocation of 
governmental functions that it is this Court's solemn duty to guard"). Perez was later over-
ruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), but no question of Congress' general power to 
legislate the conduct of foreign affairs was raised in Afroyim. Notably, Justice Frankfurter, 
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eignty have been exercised by and recognized as belonging to 
Congress. 125 The Supreme Court has recognized this inherent con-
gressional power to regulate foreign affairs, particularly when Amer-
ican citizens or residents are involved: "Although there is in the 
Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legisla-
tion for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no 
doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the 
Nation." 126 As Professor Henkin has observed, "[W]hatever the 
President might do during authorized war or by international agree-
ment, Congress alone can spend, authorize war, legislate and regu-
late generally within the United States, even in matters regarding 
foreign affairs." 127 Congress can therefore draw authority to regu-
late executive branch foreign intelligence activities within the United 
States from its share of the federal government's implicit powers of 
sovereignty .128 
The Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution may also 
empower Congress to regulate foreign intelligence surveillance 
within the United States. The Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress the power ''To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof." 129 The Supreme Court has interpreted 
this clause to permit varied congressional initiatives in the exercise of 
the federal government's many powers.130 Indeed, the Court identi-
fied this clause as the source of Congress's implicit foreign affairs 
power: "Congress has broad power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to enact legislation for the regulation of foreign affairs." 131 
The Necessary and Proper Clause carries added significance for the 
conduct of foreign relations since it authorizes Congress to imple-
ment not just its own powers, but all powers vested in any branch of 
writing for the Court in Perez, cited Curtiss-Wright as support for congressional authority to 
legislate in foreign affairs. See generally Schlesinger, Congress and the Making of American 
Foreign Policy, 51 FORElGN AFF. 78 (1972). 
125. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 44 (1963) (dictum); Perez v. 
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). 
126. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958). 
127. L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 99. 
128. Of course, this assumes that the FISA regulates foreign affairs; if not, Congress' do-
mestic legislative power under article I is surely adequate to support the legislation. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 1, and text at notes 107-17 supra. 
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
130. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
131. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). In Missouri v. Holland, 
252 U.S. 416 (1920), for example, Justice Holmes found a basis in that clause for a statute 
implementing a treaty which, it was assumed, Congress could not have enacted in the absence 
of the treaty. 
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the federal government. 132 Hence, Congress can direct the President 
and regulate how he takes "Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted." 133 The clause thus legitimizes laws, such as the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act, that support and regulate the President's 
foreign affairs and foreign intelligence activities. 134 
Courts may also view the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
as necessary and proper to protect individual rights. Although the 
Constitution does not explicitly grant Congress authority to advance 
the freedoms guaranteed in the original Articles or in the Bill of 
Rights, 135 the Preamble does state that one of the Constitution's pur-
poses is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty,"136 and the separation of 
powers established by the Constitution is largely directed toward 
that end. 137 It would be anomalous to infer individual rights and 
liberties from the structure and relationships of the Constitution 138 
while not inf erring congressional authority to promote and protect 
those individual rights and liberties. 139 At times the Supreme Court 
seems to recognize such a congressional power independent of the 
enforcement provisions of constitutional amendments. 140 More 
132. See W. VanAistyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the 
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping 
Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102 (Spring 1976). 
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See note 40 supra. 
134. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 78. Congress has this power even when the Presi-
dent asserts authority to direct executive officers contrary to congressional order. In Kendall v, 
United States ex rel Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), the Supreme Court ordered the 
Postmaster-General to expend funds over President Jackson's objection. The Court stated: 
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, 
the discharge of which is under the direction of the president. But it would be an alarm-
ing doctrine that congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they may 
think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitu-
tion; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out of and are subject to the 
control of the law, and not to the direction of the president. 
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610. 
135. But compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. If the FISA governed actions by the 
states, there would be no question that Congress could enact this legislation pursuant to the 
fourteenth amendment. 
136. U.S. CONST. Preamble. The Preamble, however, is not the source of any substantive 
powers. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II, 22 (1905). 
137. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 28, 41, 47, 51. 
138. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969), 
139. See The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 533-36 (1871) (The Necessary 
and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to carry out unenumerated powers of the federal gov-
ernment; those powers are discerned by "considering the purposes they were intended to sub-
serve"); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist [sic] with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional"). 
140. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) 
(damages available for fourth amendment infringement inferred in the absence of congres-
sional action; implying that Congress could have created a cause of action for damages for 
fourth amendment violations had it so desired); 403 U.S. at 402-06 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(same); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 369-71 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) (Congress 
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often, the Court simply assumes that Congress can protect constitu-
tional rights through legislation.141 The Necessary and Proper 
Clause therefore justifies congressional passage of the PISA both be-
cause it is the textual source of congressional authority to regulate 
foreign affairs and because it indicates that Congress has the power 
to protect individual liberties. 
Congress has adequate constitutional authority to regulate for-
eign intelligence surveillance. Both the Necessary and Proper 
Clause and Congress's share of the foreign affairs powers inherent in 
national sovereignty justify this regulation. Nevertheless, a court 
still might balk at enforcing the PISA if the Act so intrudes upon 
presidential power as to destroy his ability to protect the national 
security.142 But the Act is not that intrusive. The executive branch 
still can collect foreign intelligence (albeit under limited judicial su-
pervision), 143 and the exceptions to the strict warrant requirement144 
give the President needed flexibility. Nor does the Act fail to serve 
the interest of privacy: requiring the executive branch to articulate 
its reasons for electronic surveillance to a neutral arbiter is an ac-
cepted procedure for the protection of privacy.145 Between the ex-
tremes of usurpation of presidential power and abandonment of 
individual liberties, the courts should give great deference to con-
gressional surveillance standards. 146 The legislative shift from the 
"zone of twilight" 147 of section 2511 (3) of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act148 to the clear standard of the PISA merits 
judicial approval. 
may distinguish between religious and nomeligious conscientious objectors in recognition of 
first amendment values); cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (Congress may pro-
tect implicit right of ii!terstate travel from private interference regardless of its textual source). 
141. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972); 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 
(1976), held constitutional in, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 411 U.S. 866 (1973). 
142. The President's power to collect foreign intelligence was first recognized in Totten v. 
United States, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 105 (1876). 
143. Whether Congress could constitutionally abolish the President's surveillance powers 
entirely is not considered here. Congress has shown no inclination to take such action; it has 
always recognized the need for national security surveillances. 
144. See text at notes 87-91 supra. 
145. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Lacovara, supra note 10, at 126-
31. 
146. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972); United 
States v. Truong, No. 78-5176, slip. op. at 12 n.4 (4th Cir. July 17, 1980); compare United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
147. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952) (Jackson J., con-
curring). 
148. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text. 
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B. Judicial Competence to Grant Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Warrants: The Political Question Doctrine 
By enacting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress 
expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 149 While Congress 
has some freedom to define the jurisdiction of the Article III 
courts, 150 this power has constitutional limits. 151 Congress may not, 
for example, insist on an advisory opinion from the courts, 152 nor 
may it deprive the Supreme Court of the power to protect constitu-
tional rights. 153 Between these extremes of ungrantable and undeni-
able jurisdiction, Congress usually can alter federal court 
jurisdiction even if, in so doing, it changes the separation of pow-
ers.154 Nevertheless, the political question doctrine may prove a bar-
rier to congressional attempts to shift powers to the courts. 
Under the political question doctrine, courts will refuse to decide 
an issue which "from its nature is not a subject for judicial determi-
nation." 155 Courts look to the constitutional allocation of powers 
among the branches of government, to judicial expertise, and to their 
149. If the plurality's view in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), is accepted, the power is one which existed but which the 
courts had not previously exercised. Even if this view is not accepted, Congress has now de-
fined the previously uncertain jurisdiction of the courts. 
150. Article III, § I provides: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish . , , . 
Article III, § 2, cl. 2 provides: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all 
the other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, 
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such regulations as the con-
gress shall make. 
151. Justice Curtis announced this position in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Im-
provement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856): 
(W]e do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter 
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admi-
ralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from 
its nature is not a subject for judicial determination. At the same time, there are matters, 
involving public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is 
capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which 
congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as 
it may deem proper. 
59 U.S. at 284. Accord, United States ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950). 
152. E.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
153. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (only a court can impose a 
final restraint on expressional activities); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54-57 (1932) 
(Hughes, C.J.), 285 U.S. at 86-88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
154. The Court in Murray's Lessee, for example, found that "[e]quitable claims to land by 
the inhabitants of ceded territories form a striking instance of ... [the] class of cases" which 
Congress may or may not bring before the courts. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856). In La 
Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899), the Supreme Court held that 
Congress could ask the judiciary to decide a question of fraud underlying a claim against 
Mexico which the Executive itself might have decided. 175 U.S. at 459-61. 
155. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284; see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). 
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own sense of prudence to determine the reviewability of constitu-
tional controversies under this doctrine. 156 Although some commen-
tators argue that the political question "excuse" for refusing to 
exercise jurisdiction is grounded solely in public policy, 157 the 
Supreme Court insists that the political questio.n standard is consti-
tutionally based: 158 . ''The nonjusticiability of a political question is 
primarily a function of the separation of powers."159 
The political question doctrine is pertinent to the FISA's consti-
tutionality in two distinct ways: First, as discussed above, the doc-
trine determines whether the courts can resolve the Act's 
constitutionality.160 Assuming that they may, the doctrine then de-
termines whether the Act is a constitutional delegation of authority 
to the courts. 161 If issuing warrants for foreign intelligence surveil-
lance involves political questions that Congress cannot delegate to 
the judiciary, the FISA is unenforceable. 162 If, on the other hand, 
these questions fall within judicial cognizance or "may be presented 
in such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting,"163 the 
Act is constitutional. 
The Supreme Court best defined the political question doctrine 
in Baker v. Carr: 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly accord-
ing to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political 
question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as 
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the 
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textu-
ally demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
156. See text at notes 164 & 169 infra. 
157. See, e.g., Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). 
158. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). But see United States v. American Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 567 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
159. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
160. See text at notes 96-105 supra. 
161. In the usual application of the political question doctrine the issue is whether a court 
can resolve a question presented to it. The problem discussed in this part of the Note -
whether a congressional act is invalid because it would present the courts with political ques-
tions for their resolution - is admittedly not a typical application of the doctrine. The consti-
tutional concerns underlying the doctrine, however, are well suited to a consideration of this 
problem. 
162. E.g., United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 48 (1851); Hayburn's Case, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). 
163. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 
(1856). 
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political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question. 164 
Although the Court in Baker denounced "sweeping statements to 
the effect that all questions touching foreign relations are political 
que~tions" 165 and concluded that it is "error to suppose that every 
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judi-
cial cognizance," 166 the Court did cite, as examples of political ques-
tions, a number of foreign relations problems. 167 Of course, there is 
often a need for executive discretion, nonjudicial standards, or a 
"single-voiced statement of the Government's views"168 in the area 
of foreign relations. To decide whether these factors preclude the 
judicial activity envisioned by the FISA, this Note applies three tests 
suggested by Baker v. Carr: (1) "Does the issue involve resolution 
of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordi-
nate branch of government?"; (2) "Would resolution of the question 
demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise?"; and 
(3) "Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial interven-
tion?" 169 
The Constitution commits the formulation and conduct of for-
eign policy to Congress and the President. 170 Although the Supreme 
Court has original jurisdiction over "Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors," 171 it recognizes that this is not an invitation to make foreign 
policy for the other branches; foreign policy decisions are committed 
to the unquestioned discretion of Congress and the President. 172 The 
federal courts will only review whether Congress or the President 
has the requisite authority to pass a law or take an action related to 
foreign relations; the policy underlying the law or action is not sub-
164. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
165. 369 U.S. at 211, citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). 
166. 369 U.S. at 211. 
167. 369 U.S. at 211, citing Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Doe v. 
Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853); Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) 
(Curtis, Cir. J.), qffd., 61 U.S. (2 Black) 481 (1863). 
168. 369 U.S. at 211 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884) (the 
executive determines a person's status as a representative of a foreign government); United 
States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 149 (1820) (standards for recognition of foreign 
governments defy judicial treatment); Co=ercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) 
(need for finality in determining date of cessation of hostilities). 
169. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). See also L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 3-16, at 71 n.1 (1978). 
170. See text at notes 106-08, 118-34 supra. 
171. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2, cl. 2. 
172. See, e.g. , Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. 
Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839); Occidental of U= al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain 
Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203 
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Occidental of U= al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil 
Co., 442 U.S. 928 (1979). Cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, IO (1973) (control of military 
forces is committed to the legislative and executive branches). 
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ject to judicial review.173 
The Constitution's textual commitment of foreign policymaking 
to the political branches implies that Congress could not use the 
FISA to endow courts with pervasive authority to make foreign pol-
icy.174 Congress probably could not require courts to decide whether 
the likelihood of successful surveillance and the foreign policy value 
of the intercepted information outweigh the risk and costs of discov-
ery. Nor could the courts unilaterally decide to exempt resident 
aliens from allied countries from foreign intelligence surveillance. 
The risks worth taking for a given piece of information and the pre-
ferred treatment of citizens of different nations are questions of for-
eign policy beyond the proper scope of judicial review. While many 
court decisions will indirectly affect foreign policy, courts cannot di-
rectly intrude into the weighing of specific foreign policy considera-
tions. 
The FISA, however, does not require significant judicial intru-
sion into presidential foreign policymaking. The FISA directs 
judges to make three findings, none of which entail excessive review. 
First, the judge must find that the government has complied with the 
formalities and procedures of the Act. 175 This involves routine, 
unintrusive questions of jurisdictional fact. 176 
Second, the judge is required to determine if "there is probable 
cause to believe that- (A) the target of the electronic surveillance is 
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power . . . ; and (B) each of 
the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed 
is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent 
of a foreign power."177 This requirement interferes little with execu-
tive policymaking authority. The Government need show only that 
a person (and place) falls within the class of persons (and places) 
covered by the Act. It need not show probable cause that useful in-
173. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 213-14. 
174. The opponents of the FISA feared that this was exactly what the Congress was doing. 
See, e.g., Hearings on R.R. 7308 Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 221-22 (1978) (statement of Laurence H. Silberman): 
[T]he courts will be invited, indeed be obligated, to consider the following: 
First: What information is necessary to protect the United States against attack or 
other grave hostile acts? That is part of the definition of foreign intelligence. And that 
implies authority to determine which foreign countries are hostile to the United States, 
and I am certain after careful reading of some of these judicial opinions, there are certain 
judges who would be delighted to make that determination. But I think it is wrong. 
Second: What information, with respect to a foreign power, is deemed essential to the 
defense of the Nation or the successful conduct of foreign affairs, which implies authority 
to determine what is the successful conduct of foreign affairs? 
See also 124 CONG. REc. Hl2,535 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1978) (statement of Rep. McClory of 
Illinois). 
175. See FISA § 105(a)(l), (2) & (4) and note 79 supra. 
176. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (jurisdictional facts are those whose 
"existence is a condition precedent to the operation of a statutory scheme"). 
177. FISA § 105(a)(3). 
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formation will be obtained or that national security is threatened. 178 
Even under the minimal probable cause inquiry of the FISA, of 
course, a court will occasionally refuse surveillance in circumstances 
where the government desires it. But the degree of judicial intrusion 
into foreign policymaking is minimal. And the significant fourth 
amendment rights at issue justify that minimal intrusion. 
Finally, if a United States person is the target of the requested 
surveillance, the judge must find that the certifications of the execu-
tive officer179 (including his assurance that the information sought is 
otherwise unavailable foreign intelligence information 180) "are not 
clearly erroneous." 181 Even this clearly erroneous standard does not 
require excessive intrusion into foreign policy making. The execu-
tive branch makes the original policy decision on the importance of 
the surveillance and its necessity. The burden of proof for the execu-
tive officer can be easily met. 182 The executive branch need only 
produce some evidence that its judgment is defensible in an ex parte 
proceeding;183 the judge can neither deny a warrant application that 
meets these standards nor order a surveillance undesired by the exec-
utive branch. The PISA therefore passes the first "political ques-
tion" test. 
Even if the PISA does not compel the courts to exercise powers 
committed by the Constitution to a coequal branch, the Act's proce-
dures might still present a nonjusticiable political question if they 
embrace judicially unmanageable standards. The need for judicially 
manageable standards has been a common theme in political ques-
tion cases. In Luther v . .Borden, 184 the Supreme Court was asked to 
determine which of two competing governments was the "true" gov-
ernment of Rhode Island. The Supreme Court noted the staggering 
evidentiary problems185 (as well as the need for a single answer to 
the question - an answer the President had already provided186) 
178. Only if the surveillance target is a United States person must the Government estab• 
lish probable cause of criminal violation. FISA § I0I(b)(2). See notes 82-83 supra. 
179. See note 79 supra. 
180. FISA § IOI(e). 
181. FISA § 105(a)(5). 
182. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960), quoting 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
183. This, nevertheless, protects individuals from a naked and unreviewable executive as• 
sertion of national security. The required written application for judicial approval of surveil• 
lance is expected to enhance protection of individual privacy. See Lacovara, supra note 10, at 
127-28. 
184. 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849). 
185. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 41-42. 
186. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 44. 
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and refused to resolve the dispute. In Coleman v. Miller, 187 the 
Court in a plurality opinion refused to decide whether a proposed 
constitutional amendment lapses into oblivion if not ratified within a 
reasonable time. Chief Justice Hughes inquired rhetorically: 
"Where are to be found the criteria for . . . judicial determina-
tion?" 188 Finally, in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. 
Corp., 189 the Supreme Court held that federal courts could not apply 
ordinary procedures for judicial review of administrative action to 
presidential orders concerning international air routes: "[T]he very 
nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not ju-
dicial. Such decisions . . . are delicate, complex, and involve large 
elements of prophecy . . . . They are decisions of a kind for which 
the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibil-
ity .... "190 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court will not employ the politi-
cal question doctrine to avoid a problem that, although difficult, is 
one of a type that courts regularly face. Although United States v. 
Nixon, 191 which involved questions of access to the White House 
tapes, had strong political overtones and compelled the Court to 
scrutinize activities of a coequal branch of government, no serious 
political question controversy arose because the issue of executive 
privilege was "'of a type which [is] traditionally justiciable.' " 192 
The questions that courts must consider under the FISA do not 
seem 'judicially unmanageable." To certify compliance with the 
Act, the judge makes findings of fact193 that are part of the tradi-
tional judicial function. 194 The probable cause requirement195 -
that the surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power - is the crux of the required findings, and courts have had 
long experience with this standard in other warrant proceedings.196 
187. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
188. 307 U.S. at 453. 
189. 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
190. 333 U.S. at 111. 
191. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
192. 418 U.S. at 697, quoting United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949). 
193. See text at notes 175-76 supra. 
194. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); compare the requirements for a warrant under Title 
Ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1), (2) 
(1976 & Supp. II 1978). 
195. See text at note 177 supra. 
196. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976) (probable cause requirements for a criminal sur-
veillance warrant in Title ill of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968). 
The Supreme Court has made clear that the probable cause standard is flexible, see 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967), and that Congress may prescribe 
appropriate protective standards. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 
297, 322-23 (1972). The probable cause determinations required by the FISA are fairly easy 
for courts to apply. The requirement of probable cause of criminal conduct for the surveil-
lance of United States persons is similar to the standard for criminal surveillance warrants. 
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Finally, the clearly erroneous standard for review of the certifica-
tions of the executive officer197 is familiar to federal courts. Essen-
tially, the standard requires minimal review of the veracity of an ex 
parte request; the executive officer need only provide adequate evi-
dence to establish a reasonable belief that his certifications are cor-
rect.198 This, like the other two types of findings, is within the 
judicial competence. All the standards of the FISA are judicially 
manageable. 
The final reason the Supreme Court labels some issues as politi-
cal questions is one of prudence: should the Court, in its discretion, 
resolve the issue? Because the prudential aspect of the political ques-
tion doctrine is a matter of judicial discretion, 199 it is the least pre-
dictable of the doctrine's three inquiries.200 Nevertheless, none of 
the "prudential" formulations of the political question doctrine in 
Baker v. Carr201 justify rejecting the FISA. The first of these three 
formulations - that resolving the issue would require courts to ex-
press "lack of respect due coordinate branches of government" -
seems inapplicable. To reject jurisdiction legislated by Congress 
would entail as much disrespect for Congress as enforcing the Act 
might entail for the executive.202 The concern of the second formu-
lation - "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made"203 - is resolved by the terms of the Act. In 
emergencies (like that following a declaration of war), or exigent cir-
cumstances, the executive need not comply with the Act's general 
requirements.204 The third formulation - "the potential of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements"205 - seems equally ir-
relevant to the FISA. Because neither the President's application 
nor the special court's response are public, no public confusion re-
sults, no private expectations are disturbed, and no interbranch con-
flict is apparent. Considerations of prudence, like those of deference 
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1976). The standard for all other persons requires only a factual 
finding of criminal-type activities, FISA § lOl(b)(l)(B), or employment by a foreign power. 
FISA § lOl(b)(l)(A). None of these probable cause determinations are beyond the judicial 
cognizance. 
197. See text at notes 179-83 supra. 
198. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 29.02 (1972). 
199. See L. HENKIN, supra note 100, at 215-16. 
200. For example, in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), Justice Frankfurter 
successfully cautioned the Court "not to enter [the] political thicket" of voting district reappor-
tionment, but he could not convince a majority of the Court on the same issue in Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
201. 369 U.S. at 217, quoted in text at note 164 supra. 
202. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Interpre-
tation of the Constitution does not imply lack of respect for a coordinate branch"). 
203. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
204. See text at notes 87-91 infra. 
205. 369 U.S. at 217. 
June 1980] Note - Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 1151 
and manageability, therefore do not require that courts refuse to en-
force the FISA. 
CONCLUSION 
No single branch of government is especially "good" or espe-
cially "evil." All three branches of the federal government have dis-
regarded or abused individual liberties at some time in American 
history.206 The separation of powers doctrine contemplates that all 
branches of the federal government have a duty to protect personal 
freedoms,207 especially when those freedoms are challenged by a 
claim as strong, and as legitimate, as preserving the national security. 
Alexander Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers that the struc-
ture of the proposed government, accompanied by certain protec-
tions granted in the original articles of the Constitution,2°8 made a 
Bill of Rights unnecessary.209 Although this view was rejected with 
the adoption of the first ten amendments, the importance of the sepa-
ration of powers in protecting individual rights has not been dis-
placed. 
Interpreted properly, the separation of powers doctrine holds not 
that each branch of government exercises exclusive powers, but 
rather that the branches share powers so that each can check abuses 
by the others.210 The framers of the Constitution recognized both 
that ambitious, overreaching people exist and come to power,211 and 
that other people, committed to protecting individual liberties and 
democracy, will choose to protect and preserve those liberties.212 
Any power vested without limitation in one branch of the govern-
ment creates a potential for abuse unchecked by the other 
206. See, e.g., The Alien_ and Sedition Act, ch. 58, l Stat. 570 (1798) (congressional); 
"Watergate" and "national security" surveillances and break-ins, sources cited in notes 21 & 
27 supra (executive); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (judicial). 
207. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 18 (congressional power "to make all ... Laws 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion .•. "); U.S. CONST. art. II,§ I, cl. 8 (presidential oath to "preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States"); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137 (1803) (Mar-
shall, C.J.) (judicial refusal to give effect to congressional legislation inconsistent with the Con-
stitution). 
208. E.g., the Writ of Habeas Corpus, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; the prohibition of ex 
post facto laws, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
209. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 84, 85, at 575-81, 587-88 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see generally G. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 536-47 (1969). 
210. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323-27 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison); see G. WOOD, 
supra note 209, at 547-53. 
211. "The supposition of universal venality in human nature is little less an error in politi-
cal reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude." THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513-14 
(J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton). Accord, Scanlan, The Federalist and Human Nature, 21 REV. 
OF POL. 657 (1959). 
212. See generally Wright, The Federalist on the Nature of Political Man, 59 ETHICS l 
(1949). 
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branches.213 
Under this interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine, 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act survives constitutional at-
tacks. Congress has authority to protect fourth amendment privacy 
interests by regulating the intelligence gathering activities of the 
President. The Act protects this personal liberty without unduly 
constraining foreign intelligence gathering in the United States. And 
the role of courts in reviewing surveillance applications is both con-
stitutional and reasonable. Because it strikes a reasonable and con-
stitutional balance between fourth amendment rights and executive 
authority to gather foreign intelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act is sustained, not defeated, by the doctrine of separation 
of powers. 
213. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332-35 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison). 
